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Abstract
Why does individual performance pay seem to prevail in human-
capital-intensive industries where teamwork is so common? We present
a model that aims to explain this. In a repeated game model of rela-
tional contracting, we analyze the conditions for implementing peer-
dependent incentive regimes when agents possess indispensable human
capital. We show that the larger the share of values that the agents
can hold-up, the lower is the implementable degree of peer-dependent
incentives. In a setting with team eﬀects - complementary tasks and
peer pressure, respectively - we show that while group-based incen-
tives are optimal if agents are dispensable, it may be costly, and in
fact suboptimal, to provide team incentives once the agents become
indispensable.
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1 Introduction
Firm value is increasingly dependent on human capital. The share of physical
capital in publicly traded corporations has dramatically decreased the last
30 years (see e.g. Blair and Kochan, 2000). At the same time we observe
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a higher degree of individual performance pay in modern corporations (see
e.g. Brown and Heywood, 2002). Are these trends related? Several studies
indicate so. Long and Shields (2005) find that individual performance pay
is more likely to be found in firms with highly educated employees, while
studies by Kato (2002) and Torrington (1993) indicate that workers with
more education are particularly interested in receiving rewards tailored to
individual performance. Tremblay and Chenevert (2004) find that high-tech
firms (characterized by a high percentage of scientists and engineers in the
workforce) are more likely to use individual performance pay, but not group
pay, and a recent study by Barth et al. (2006) indicates that group-based
incentives is decreasing for those with higher education, while it is increasing
for blue-collar workers. Individual performance pay, on the other hand, is
found to be strongly associated with firms with a highly educated workforce.1
Why is this? Barth et al. (2006) suggest that the quality and eﬀort of
high-skilled workers have larger impacts on productivity than the quality and
eﬀort of other groups of workers. They lend support from Brown (1990) who
argues that in high-skilled jobs, worker output is more sensitive to worker
quality compared to jobs requiring less skill. In our view, these are plausible,
but not satisfactory explanations. Group-based incentives are desirable when
teamwork is important, when there exists peer pressure, or when it is diﬃcult
to identify each worker’s contribution to firm value. It is hard to see that this
applies less to educated employees. In fact, several HR scholars have argued
that knowledge-intensive organizations’ emphasis on innovation, teamwork
and projects calls for group-based incentives (see e.g. Balkin and Bannister,
1993).
In this paper we recognize two features of human capital that neccesitate a
high degree of individual performance pay in knowledge-intensive industries.
First, the true performance of educated employees is often diﬃcult to verify
by third parties. Objective measures of performance seldom exists, and even
if they do, looser assessments of performance also aﬀect compensation (see
e.g. MacLeod, 2003). Consequently, incentive contracts specifying criteria
for performance pay are seldom fully protected by the court. Second, human
capital blurs the allocation of ownership rights. According to the standard
view of ownership, it is the owner of an asset who has residual control right
over the asset; that is “the right to decide all usages of the asset in any way
not inconsistent with a prior contract, custom or law” (Hart, 1995). If the
asset involved in the worker’s production is his ownmind and knowledge, then
1In addition, several studies show that firms with low union coverage are more willing
to use individualized incentive schemes (see e.g. Brown, 1990; Parent, 2002; and Long and
Shields, 2005), and union coverage is lower among high-skilled workers (Acemoglu et al.
2001).
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he also is to decide all non-contractual usages. An indispensable ”knowledge
worker” can therefore threaten to walk away with ideas, clients, techniques
etcetera. As noted by Liebeskind (2000), human-capital-intensive firms must
induce their employees to stay around long enough so that the firm can
establish some intellectual property rights with respect to the ideas generated
by these employees, or else these firms run the risk of being expropriated or
held-up by their own employees.2
Why do these two features - incomplete contracts and indispensable hu-
man capital - prepare the way for individual performance pay? In other
words: Why is it diﬃcult to implement peer-dependent incentives when per-
formance is unverifiable and workers possess residual control rights? The
answer is intuitive when we think of the incentives facing an agent who is a
full residual claimant: He simply gets the values he has produced; the mar-
ket incentives are independent from what other agents produce. Hence, if a
principal wants to implement a peer-dependent incentive contract, she faces a
problem if the agents have residual control rights. With relative performance
evaluation (RPE) an agent is not paid well if his peer performs better, while
with joint performance evaluation (JPE) he is not paid well if his peers’ per-
formance is poor. This peer-dependence may lead to contract breach: an
agent who is paid a low bonus after realizing a high output, has incentives to
hold-up his output and renegotiate payments. Of course, a hold-up strategy
is only possible if the agent actually is able to prevent the principal from real-
izing the agent’s value added ex post production. But if hold-up is possible,
then RPE and JPE schemes are more susceptible to hold-up than incentive
schemes based on independent performance evaluation (IPE).
The parties can mitigate the hold-up problem through repeated interac-
tion, i.e. through self-enforcing relational contracting 3 (also called implicit
contracting) where contract breach is punished, not by the court, but by the
parties who can refuse to cooperate after a deviation. But since a hold-up will
be regarded as a deviation from such a relational contract, the self-enforcing
range of the contract is limited by the hold-up problem. And since the hold-
2It should be noted that indispensability is mainly achieved through investments in
firm-specific human capital. Hence, a worker who possesses indispensable human capital
is not necessarily highly educated, and education does not guarantee indispensability.
However, specific human capital is strongly associated with high levels of formal education
(see Blundell et al., 1999).
3Influential models of relatonal contracts include Klein and Leﬄer (1981), Shapiro and
Stiglitz (1984), Bull (1987), Kreps (1990), Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994, 2002),
Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995). MacLeod and Malcomson (1989) generalize the case of
symmetric information, while Levin (2003) makes a general treatment of relational con-
tracts with asymmetric information, allowing for incentive problems due to moral hazard
and hidden information.
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up problem is most severe in JPE and RPE, we can expect a larger fraction
of IPE when hold-up is feasible.
Is this a problem? Yes, the literature has pointed out numerous reasons
for why it may be eﬃcient to tie an agent’s compensation to the performance
of the agent’s peers. By tying compensation to the agent’s relative perfor-
mance, the principal can filter out common noise so that compensation to
the largest possible extent is based on real eﬀort, not random shocks that are
outside the agent’s control (see Holmström,1982; and Mookherjee, 1984).
With RPE’s special form, rank-order tournaments, the agents are also com-
pletely insulated from the risk of common negative shocks (see Lazear and
Rosen, 1981; Nalebuﬀ and Stiglitz, 1983; Green and Stokey, 1983). More-
over, tournaments need only rely on ordinal performance measures. It may
thus be easier and less costly to measure relative than absolute performance
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981). In addition, it may be easier for the principal to
commit to tournament schemes if output is not verifiable, since the number
of ’high bonuses’ are smaller than under independent contracts (Carmichael,
1983; Malcomson, 1984; Levin, 2002).
There are also obvious arguments for tying compensation to the joint per-
formance of a group of agents. Joint performance evaluation can promote co-
operation since an agent is rewarded if his peers perform well (see e.g. Holm-
ström and Milgrom, 1990; Itoh 1993; and Macho-Stadler and Perez-Castrillo,
1993). JPE can also provide implicit incentives not to shirk (or exert low
eﬀort), since shirking may have social costs (as in Kandel and Lazear, 1992),
or induce other agents to shirk, which again reduces the shirking agent’s
expected compensation (as in Che and Yoo, 2001).
But both RPE and JPE have drawbacks. JPE may be susceptible to
free-riding (see e.g. Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; and Holmström, 1982),
while RPE is susceptible to collusion (see e.g. Mookherjee, 1984). RPE
may also induce sabotage and discourage cooperation (see Lazear, 1995, for
a discussion of the costs and benefits of RPE and JPE).
In this paper we provide a new rationale for independent performance
evaluation. We begin (Section 2) by analyzing a simple model where IPE,
RPE and JPE are equally eﬃcient when output is verifiable. With unveri-
fiable output, no incentive contracts are viable in the static setting. In the
repeated setting, however, incentive contracts are viable for suﬃciently large
discount factors. A main result from this section then goes as follows: the
maximum dependence between agent i’s bonus and agent j’s output that the
principal can implement, decreases with the share of values that the agents
can hold-up ex post, and for a suﬃciently large share only IPE remains fea-
sible.
We then (Section 3) demonstrate the importance of agent-hold up in
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a setting with team eﬀects. We consider two cases: complementary tasks
and peer pressure. We show that a stark JPE contract is optimal only if the
agents’ hold-up power is suﬃciently low. In the case of complementary tasks,
the optimal implementable scheme becomes less JPE and more IPE the larger
the share of values the agents can hold-up. In the case of peer pressure, any
JPE scheme becomes suboptimal once the relational contract constraints
bind. The reason is that once the outside market becomes tempting, the
principal can no longer use JPE to exploit peer pressure eﬀects, but has to
compensate the agents for any disutility that team incentives provide.
Broadly speaking, our contribution is to consider the eﬀect of residual
control rights in a multiagent moral hazard model. In the vast literature
on multiagent moral hazard it is (implicitly) assumed that residual control
rights are exclusively in the hands of the principal. And in the growing liter-
ature dealing with optimal allocation of control rights, the multiagent moral
hazard problem is not considered. (This literature begins with Grossman and
Hart, 1986; and Hart and More,1990,4 who analyze static relationships. Re-
peated relationships are analyzed in particular by Halonen, 2002; and Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy, 2002). Our paper also contributes to the literature by
introducing other-regarding preferences and team technology in a relational
contracting set-up.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and
deduce the optimal relational incentive contract. Section 3 introduces team
eﬀects, while Section 4 oﬀer some concluding remarks.
2 The Model
Consider an economic environment consisting of one principal and two iden-
tical agents who each period produce either high, QH , or low, QL, values for
the principal. Each agent’s eﬀort level can be either high or low, where high
eﬀort has a disutility cost of c and low eﬀort is costless. The principal can
only observe the realization of the agents’ output, not the level of eﬀort they
choose. Similarly, agent i can only observe agent j ’s output, not his eﬀort
level.5
The agents’ outputs depend on eﬀorts. Output realizations are stochasti-
4Although Hart and Moore (1990) analyze a model with many agents, they do not
consider the classical moral hazard problem that we address, where a principal can only
observe a noisy measure of the agents’ eﬀort.
5Whether or not the agents can observe each others eﬀort level is not decisive for the
analysis presented. However, by assuming that eﬀort is unobservable among the agents,
we do not need to model repeated peer monitoring.
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cally independent, but each agent’s success probability is generally assumed
to depend on the agent’s own as well as his partner’s eﬀort. We will see
that technological complementarities between the agents, in the sense that
an agent’s success probability is strictly increasing in his partner’s eﬀort, is
an argument for making use of JPE in this setting.
In a first version of the model we will however assume that there are no
such technological externalities between the agents. While this assumption
removes the rationale for using peer-dependent incentive schemes (and thus
makes JPE, RPE and IPE equally eﬀective if output is verifiable), it allows
us to introduce and analyze the implications of non-verifiability and agent
hold-up in a simple setting. The point of this first version of the model is to
show that agent hold-up may severely limit the range of incentive schemes
that can be implemented under relational contracting. In this section we
thus assume that the probability for agent i of realizing QH depends only on
the agent’s own eﬀort. The probability is qH if eﬀort is high and qL if eﬀort
is low, where 1 > qH > qL ≥ 0.
It is assumed that all parties are risk neutral, but that the agents are
subject to limited liability: the principal cannot impose negative wages.6
Ex ante outside options are normalized to zero. The participation constraint
then holds trivially by the limited liability assumption.
We assume that if the parties engage in an incentive contract, agent i
receives a bonus vector β ≡ (βiHH , βiHL, βiLH , βiLL) where the subscripts
refer to respectively agent i and agent j ’s realization of Qi, (i = H,L).
Let agents i and j choose eﬀorts k ∈ {H,L} and l ∈ {H,L} respectively.
Agent i ’s expected wage is then
π(k, l,βi) ≡ qkqlβiHH+qk(1−ql)βiHL+(1−qk)qlβiLH+(1−qk)(1−ql)βiLL (1)
For each agent, a wage scheme exhibits joint performance evaluation if
(βHH , βLH) > (βHL, βLL)7. (For the most part, we suppress agent-notation
in superscript since the agents are identical.) In this case π(k,H,β) >
π(k, L,β), so an agent’s work yields positive externalities to his partner. A
wage scheme exhibits relative performance evaluation if (βHH , βLH) < (βHL
βLL). In this case π(k,H,β) < π(k, L,β), so an agent’s work generates
a negative externality for his partner. A wage scheme exhibits indepen-
dent performance evaluation if (βHH ,βLH) = (βHL βLL), which implies
π(k,H,β) = π(k, L,β), so an agent’s work has no impact on his partner.
6Limited liability may arise from liquidity constraints or from laws that prohibit firms
from extracting payments from workers.
7The inequality means weak inequality of each component and strict inequality for at
least one component.
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This set-up follows Che and Yoo’s (2001). As shown by these authors,
peer-monitoring is a rationale for making use of peer-dependent incentives
such as JPE. We introduce and explore instead (in the next section) techno-
logical complementarities and peer pressure in this setting. We also extend
their model by assuming non-verifiable output, and that agents are able to
hold-up values ex post. 8
2.1 Optimal contract when output is verifiable
As a benchmark, we first consider the least cost incentive contract when
output is verifiable. For an incentive contract to be viable, the value of high
eﬀort must weakly exceed the cost of eﬀort, that is
∆q∆Q ≥ c (2)
where ∆q = qH−qL and ∆Q = QH−QL. Assuming that (2) holds, the prin-
cipal’s problem is to minimize the wage payments subject to the constraints
that the agents must be induced to yield high eﬀort. A contract β induces
both agents to work if
π(H,H,β)− c ≥ π(L,H,β) (3)
The left hand side (LHS) shows the expected wage from exerting high eﬀort,
while the right hand side (RHS) shows the expected wage from exerting
low eﬀort. The condition ensures that high eﬀort from both agents is an
equilibrium, given the contract β. The agents’ equilibrium is unique if high
eﬀort is a dominant strategy, i.e. if π(H,L, β) − c ≥ π(L,L,β) holds in
addition to (3). We will discuss uniqueness below.
The principal solves
min
β≥0
π(H,H,β), subject to (3) (4)
The incentive compatibility (IC) constraint (3) can be written
qHβHH + (1− qH)βHL − qHβLH − (1− qH)βLL ≥
c
∆q
(IC)
Now, by IC and the definition of π we have
π = qH [qHβHH + (1− qH)βHL] + (1− qH) [qHβLH + (1− qH)βLL] (5)
≥ qH
c
∆q
+ [qHβLH + (1− qH)βLL]
8Kvaløy and Olsen (2006) analyze a multilateral relational contract with repeated peer-
monitoring. But team technology, peer pressure and agent hold-up is not considered in
that model.
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From this inequality and limited liability (βLH ,βLL ≥ 0) we obtain:
Lemma 1 If output is verifiable, the minimal wage cost for the principal is
πm = qH c∆q . Any wage scheme that has βLH = βLL = 0 and satisfies IC with
equality is optimal.
Remark. As noted above, a contract will induce high eﬀort from both
agents as a unique equilibrium in the agents’ game if in addition to IC it
satisfies π(H,L,β) − c ≥ π(L,L,β). It can be shown (see the appendix)
that for any contract that satisfies IC with equality, this condition will hold
if the contract is RPE or IPE, but it will not hold if the contract is JPE.
For the contracts given in the lemma, only the RPE or IPE contracts will
thus yield uniqueness. A contract that is JPE (βHH > βHL) yields two
equilibria, with eﬀorts (H,H) and (L,L), respectively. But as shown in the
appendix, the latter yields a smaller payoﬀ than the former, since we have
π(H,H,β)− c > π(L,L,β). Thus it seems reasonable to assume that also a
JPE contract will induce high eﬀort from both agents.
2.2 Relational contracting
Assume now that output is non-verifiable. The incentive contract must then
be self-enforcing, and thus ‘relational’ by definition. We consider a multi-
lateral punishment structure where any deviation by the principal triggers
low eﬀort from both agents. The principal honors the contract only if both
agents honored the contract in the previous period. The agents honor the
contract only if the principal honored the contract with both agents in the
previous period. A natural explanation for this is that the agents interpret a
unilateral contract breach (i.e. the principal deviates from the contract with
only one of the agents) as evidence that the principal is not trustworthy (see
Bewley, 1999, and Levin, 2002).9
The relational incentive contract is self-enforcing if the present value of
honoring is greater than the present value of reneging. Ex post realiza-
tions of values, the principal can renege on the contract by refusing to pay
the promised wage, while the agents can renege by refusing to accept the
promised wage, and instead hold-up values and renegotiate what we can call
a spot contract. The spot price is denoted ηQi. If values accrue directly to
the principal, then η = 0. But if the agent is able to hold-up values ex-post,
9Modelling multilateral punishments is also done for convenience. Bilateral punish-
ments will not alter our results qualitatively.
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then η is determined by bargaining power, outside options and the ability
to hold-up values. Assume that there exists an alternative market for the
agents’ output, and that the agents are able to independently realize values
θQi, θ ∈ (0, 1) ex post.10 If we assume Nash bargaining between principal
and agents, each agent will then receive θQi plus a share γ from the surplus
from trade i.e. θQi + γ(Qi − θQi) = ηQi where η = γ + θ(1− γ).
It should be noted that the ability to hold-up values rests on the assump-
tion that agents become indispensable in the process of production (as in e.g.
Halonen, 2002). We do not analyze the incentives to invest in firm-specific
human capital (as in e.g Kessler and Lülfesmann, 2006). Rather, we just as-
sume that agents become indispensable ex post, and then focus on how this
aﬀects the multiagent moral hazard problem. We thus follow the relational
contracting literature, and abstract from human capital accumulation. The
level of θQi and ηQi is therefore assumed to be exogenously given and con-
stant each period. This also allows us to concentrate on stationary relational
contracts.11
The parties are assumed to play trigger strategies. If the principal reneges
on the relational contract, both agents insist on spot contracting forever after.
And vice versa: if one of the agents (or both) renege, the principal insists on
spot contracting forever after.
For a relational contract to dominate a spot contract, the agents cannot
have incentives to exert high eﬀort in a spot contract, that is
η∆q∆Q < c (6)
Hence, if (2) and (6) hold, an incentive contract inducing both agents to
exert high eﬀort dominates a spot contract. Throughout the paper it will be
assumed that both these conditions hold, so that we have
η <
c
∆q∆Q
≤ 1.
2.2.1 Contract constraints
Consider now the conditions for the incentive contract to be self-enforcing, i.e.
the conditions for implementing a relational incentive contract. The parties
decide whether or not to honor the incentive contract ex post realization of
10The parameter θ depends on the specificity of the agents’ value-added. The higher
specificity, the lower is θ.
11In a stationary contract, the principal promises the same contingent compensation in
each period.
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output, but ex ante bonus payments. The principal will honor the contract
if
−βij − βji+
2δ
1− δ [QL + qH∆Q− π(H,H,β)]
≥ −η(Qi +Qj) +
2δ
1− δ [QL + qL∆Q− S] , i, j ∈ {H,L}
where S = η(QL + qL∆Q) is the expected spot price. The LHS of the
inequality shows the principal’s expected present value from honoring the
contract, while the RHS shows the expected present value from reneging.
We see that the constraint binds when βij+βji−η(Qi+Qj) is maximal. We
can thus write the condition as
max {2βHH − 2ηQH ,βHL + βLH − η(QH +QL), 2βLL − 2ηQL}
≤ 2δ
1− δ [∆q∆Q+ S − π(H,H,β)] (EP)
Agent i will honor the contract if
βij+
δ
1− δ (π(H,H,β)− c) ≥ ηQi +
δ
1− δS, i, j ∈ {H,L}
where similarly the LHS shows the agent’s expected present value from
honoring the contract, while the RHS shows the expected present value from
reneging. The constraint binds when βij−ηQi is minimal. We can thus write
the condition as
min {βHH − ηQH ,βHL − ηQH ,βLH − ηQL,βLL − ηQL}
≥ δ
1− δ [S − π(H,H,β) + c] (EA)
2.2.2 Optimal relational contract
To minimize expected wage costs, the principal will solve
minπ(H,H,β)
subject to (IC), (EP) and (EA)
Now, we showed that IC implies (5), and from this relation and EA
(applied to βLH and βLL) we have
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π ≥ qH
c
∆q
+ ηQL +
δ
1− δ [S − π + c]
Collecting terms involving π and substituting for S = η (QL + qL∆Q) we
obtain
π ≥ qH
c
∆q
+ ηQL − δ(
c
∆q
− η∆Q)qL
Since IC and limited liability (βLH ,βLL ≥ 0) implies π ≥ qH c∆q , we see
that we have the following lower bound for the wage cost
π ≥ qH
c
∆q
+max{0, ηQL − δ( c∆q − η∆Q)qL} = πmin
The last term in πmin reflects the influence of the enforceability conditions
(EA) for the agent. When this term is positive, it is impossible to implement
and enforce a relational contract where the agent is paid βLH = βLL = 0 for a
low outcome, and the wage cost for the principal will therefore exceed the cost
for the verifiable case. Higher wages ease implementation by making it less
tempting for the agent to break the relationship by oﬀering his value-added
to outsiders.
The additional cost is increasing in η, the share of the value that the
agent can hold-up ex post. The cost is naturally decreasing in δ, since higher
discount factors ease implementation. We will here restrict attention to cases
where the hold-up problem is serious in the sense that the cost is positive for
all δ < 1. This will be the case when the share parameter η is suﬃciently
large, more precisely when it satisfies12
η ≥ η0 =
cqL
∆q
1
QL +∆QqL
The derivation of the lower bound πmin above shows that in order to
minimize the additional cost associated with non-verifiability and agent hold-
up, the principal must set βLH = βLL, i.e. ensure that an agent’s pay for
low output is independent of the other agent’s output. Each agent eﬀectively
receives a fixed wage βLH = βLL independent of outputs, and then some
additional bonus (βHj−βLj) is paid if he realizes high output. This additional
bonus may depend on his peer’s outcome, but as we shall see the scope for
such dependence is quite limited.
The limits are imposed in part by the dynamic enforceability constraints
(EA). We have seen that to achieve the minimal wage cost these constraints
must be binding for the outcomes LL and LH. The derivation of πmin also
12Note that η0∆q∆Q < c, so (6) is not violated.
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shows that the ’fixed wage’ associated with these outcomes (βLH = βLL)
generates the additional cost term in the expression for πmin, and that we
hence have (for η > η0):
βLH = βLL = ηQL − δ(
c
∆q
− η∆Q)qL > 0 (8)
Since the enforceability constraint (EA) is binding for these two bonuses, it
follows that we can write this constraint for the other bonuses in the following
form:
min{βHH − η∆Q,βHL − η∆Q} ≥ βLH = βLL (EA’)
This relation says that the bonus increments for high output βHH − βLH
and βHL−βLL must both exceed η∆Q, which is the additional value of high
output for the agent outside the relationship. At the same time the bonuses
must be incentive compatible with high eﬀort, and to minimize costs they
must satisfy IC with equality, which is to say that we must have
qH(βHH − βLH) + (1− qH)(βHL − βLL) =
c
∆q
(IC’)
Note that an IPE scheme with βHj − βLj = c∆q will certainly fulfill both
constraints EA’ and IC’, given that we have assumed c∆q > η∆Q, see (6).
The constraints imply that to generate minimal costs and be implementable
a scheme cannot deviate too much from IPE. Before discussing that further,
we summarize the findings so far in the following lemma.
Lemma 2 For η > η0 the minimal wage cost that fulfills IC and EA is
obtained when (i) IC binds and (ii) the dynamic enforceability constraint EA
binds for outcomes LH and LL. The wage scheme satisfies (8), EA’ and IC’,
and the minimal cost is
πmin = qH
c
∆q
+ ηQL − δ(
c
∆q
− η∆Q)qL
Figure 1 provides an illustration.
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The figure depicts the IC constraint and the ”reduced form” dynamic enforce-
ability constraints for the agents (EA’) as functions of the bonus increments
βHL − βLL and βHH − βLH (where βLH = βLL). Here points above, on and
below the diagonal represent, respectively, JPE, IPE and RPE contracts.
The figure illustrates that only a limited set of contracts on IC satisfies the
agents’ enforceability constraints.
To be fully feasible a contract must also satisfy the dynamic enforceability
constraint for the principal (EP). As we will now demonstrate, this constraint
can be represented in reduced form as the curve marked EP’ in Figure 1.
Using (8), EA’ and substituting for S and π = πmin in EP, we see that this
constraint can be written
max {2(βHH − βLH − η∆Q), (βHL − βLL − η∆Q)} ≤
2δ
1− δ [∆q∆Q− c]
(EP’)
This ”reduced form” EP constraint can evidently be represented as the
curve marked EP’ in Figure 1. The curve has a kink at βHH − βLH =
1
2
(βHL− βLL+ η∆Q), and its position depends on δ. For given bonuses, the
constraint requires that the discount factor δ must be suﬃciently large to
guarantee implementability. Conversely, for given δ the constraint limits the
set of bonuses that can be implemented; in particular we see that the bonus
increments βHj − βLj cannot be too large.
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The minimal discount factor δ = bδ for which a bonus scheme satisfying
IC and EA’ also satisfies EP’ is obtained when the kink of the EP’ curve in
Figure 1 is positioned on IC, i.e. when IC, EP’ and 2(βHH − βLH − η∆Q) =
βHL − βLL − η∆Q hold jointly. This yields the following condition for bδ
1− bδbδ = [∆q∆Q− c]c− η∆Q∆q∆q(2− qH) (9)
This proves statement (i) in the following proposition. Statement (ii) is
proved in the appendix.
Proposition 1 (i) For η ≥ η0 and δ ≥ bδ a wage scheme satisfying (8), IC,
EA’ and EP’ is optimal. The minimal wage cost is given by πmin, and any
other implementable wage scheme yields a higher cost. (ii) No wage scheme
yielding high eﬀort can be implemented for δ < bδ
In the appendix we also verify that the wage scheme satisfies the following
conditions
π(H,H,β)− c ≥ S (10)
∆q∆Q ≥ π(H,H,β)− S (11)
The first shows that the agents’ expected payment from the incentive
contract exceeds the expected spot price, and the second shows that the
principal’s expected surplus from the contract exceeds the surplus from spot
contracting. All parties are therefore better oﬀ with the relational contract
than with a spot contract.
Regarding uniqueness in the game played by the agents, the remark that
was given for the verifiable case (following Lemma 1) applies also in this case.
The high eﬀort equilibrium is unique only if the contract is RPE or IPE. If
the contract is JPE, there is also a low eﬀort equilibrium, but it has a strictly
lower payoﬀ than the high eﬀort equilibrium.
Proposition 1 shows that an optimal wage scheme satisfies IC and is
bounded by the reduced form dynamic implementability constraints EA’ and
EP’. Consider now variations in η. As η increases (for δ fixed), the curve
representing EA’ in Figure 1 moves outwards along the 45 degree line with
the EP’-curve ’attached to it’. The IC curve remains fixed, and thus a smaller
set of bonuses remains admissible. In the limit, as η → c∆q∆Q , only a single
bonus (βHH = βHL on IC) remains admissible. Hence, the agents’ ability to
hold up values ex post calls for incentives based on independent performance
evaluation. We have:
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Proposition 2 The maximum dependence between agent i’s bonus and agent
j’s output that the principal can implement, decreases with the share of values
that the agents can hold-up ex post, and for a suﬃciently large share only IPE
remains feasible. In particular, for an optimal and feasible wage scheme we
have βLH = βLL and |βHH − βHL| ≤ ( c∆q −η∆Q)k → 0 as η → c∆q∆Q , where
k = max{ 1
qH
, 1
1−qH }
To verify the last assertion in the proposition, note from Lemma 2 that
we have βLH = βLL and min{βHH ,βHL} ≥ η∆Q+ βLL, and then from (IC’)
qHβHH + (1− qH)βHL = c∆q + βLL. Hence it follows that qH(βHH − βHL) ≤
c
∆q −η∆Q and (1−qH)(βHL−βHH) ≤
c
∆q −η∆Q. This proves the assertion.
Finally note also that higher η eases implementation of high eﬀort. This
is seen in the expression for the critical factor bδ, which shows that bδ → 0 as
η → c∆q∆Q .
3 Team incentives
We will now demonstrate the importance of agent-hold up in a setting where
there exists team eﬀects. Such eﬀects can take many forms; here we analyze
two cases: Complementary tasks and peer pressure.
3.1 Complementary tasks
Assume as before that output realizations are stochastically independent.
But assume now that each agent’s success probability depends on the agent’s
own as well as his partner’s eﬀort. Let q(h, k) here denote this probability,
where h, k refer to own and partner’s eﬀort, respectively. For simplicity we
assume perfect complements:
q(H,H) = qˆH
q(H,L) = q(L,H) = q(L,L) = qL, where qL < qˆH
This implies that high eﬀort from one agent is productive only if the other
agent also exerts high eﬀort. If both agents exert high eﬀort, the probability
for each agent of realizing high output is qˆH . If not, the probability is qL, i.e.
if agent i exerts high eﬀort, and agent j exerts low eﬀort, the probability for
agent i (and agent j) of realizing high output is qL. In this setting we have:
π(H,H,β) = qˆ2HβHH + qˆH(1− qˆH)(βHL + βLH) + (1− qˆH)2βLL (12)
π(L,H,β) = q2LβHH + qL(1− qL)(βHL + βLH) + (1− qL)2βLL
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For the case of verifiable output it is here straightforward to see that a stark
JPE scheme (βHH , 0, 0, 0) can implement high eﬀort at lower cost than an IPE
scheme (β, β, 0, 0). For the former the IC constraint yields (qˆ2H − q2L)βHH ≥ c
and thus expected costs qˆ2H
c
qˆ2H−q2L
, while for the latter the IC constraint yields
(qˆH − qL)βHH ≥ c and thus expected costs qˆH cqˆH−qL . The reason behind this
result is as follows: When tasks are complements, low eﬀort from agent i
yields a negative externality on agent j. With JPE, the agent is punished
for this, i.e. JPE internalizes the externality to some extent. This makes it
less costly to implement high eﬀort under JPE than under IPE. Indeed, the
stark JPE scheme dominates all other schemes, as we now shall see.13
The IC constraint π(H,H,β)− c ≥ π(L,H,β), can here be written:
[qˆH + qL]βHH +[1− qˆH − qL] (βHL+βLH)− [2− qˆH − qL]βLL ≥
c
∆q
(ICt)
where ∆q = qˆH − qL. Substituting for βHH from the IC constraint (ICt)
into the expression for π(H,H,β) we obtain the following inequality (see the
appendix)
π ≥ qˆ
2
H
qˆ2H − q2L
c+
p
2
(βHL + βLH) + (1− p)βLL, where p =
2qˆHqL
qˆH + qL
< qˆH
(13)
It follows from this expression that for verifiable output it is optimal to set
βHL = βLH = βLL = 0, and thus (from ICt) βHH =
c
qˆ2H−q2L
. So we have
Proposition 3 If output is verifiable, and the agents’ tasks are perfect com-
plements, there is a unique optimal wage scheme, namely the JPE scheme
β =(βHH , 0, 0, 0) where βHH =
c
qˆ2H−q2L
. The associated minimal wage cost is
πm =
qˆ2H
qˆ2H−q2L
c
What happens, then, if output is non-verifiable? Consider first the re-
lational contract constraint EA. Using EA for βHL, βLH , βLL in (13) yields
(see the appendix):
π ≥ qˆ
2
H
qˆ2H − q2L
c+
q2
qˆH + qL
qLη∆Q+ ηQL − δ
µ
c
∆q
− η∆Q
¶
q2L
qˆH + qL
= πm(δ)
(14)
13The results from this subsection do not hinge on perfect complementarity between
the agents’ tasks. It can be shown that any level of task complementarity yields JPE-
optimality in our set-up.
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Define η1 as the smallest value of η that makes the sum of the last two terms
in the expression positive for all δ ≤ 1, i.e.
η1 =
c
∆q
q2L
(qˆH + qL)QL +∆Qq2L
Reasoning as in the previous section we then obtain the following result (see
the appendix):
Lemma 3 For η ≥ η1 the minimal wage cost subject to IC and EA is
given by πm(δ). This is attained when IC binds, and when EA binds for
βHL, βLH , βLL. The unique bonuses are given by
βHH = βHL +
1
qˆH + qL
(
c
∆q
− η∆Q) > βHL = βLL + η∆Q,
βLH = βLL = ηQL − δ(
c
∆q
− η∆Q) q
2
L
qˆH + qL
(15)
The wage scheme given in Lemma 3 is JPE, but has a less stark form
than the optimal scheme for verifiable output. And we see that the larger
is the agent’s ex post share η, the closer the scheme is to an IPE scheme;
specifically we see that βHH − βHL → 0 as η → c∆q∆Q .
Figure 1 can again be used as an illustration. Note that in the model of
the previous section (with no team eﬀects) the iso-cost lines for π(H,H,β)
have the same slope as IC in the figure, namely 1−qH
qH
. In the present model
the iso-cost lines would be steeper than IC in the figure, the slopes would be
1−qˆH
qˆH
and 1−qˆH−qL
qˆH+qL
, respectively. (This follows from (12) and ICt, respectively,
when βLH = βLL.) Seeking the lowest cost, the principal is constrained by
the EA constraint, and hence is lead to the contract represented by the
upper intersection point of IC and EP’ in the figure. This corresponds to the
contract given in Lemma 3. As the agent’s ex post share η increases, this
point moves towards the diagonal, i.e. towards an IPE contract.
To be implementable, a wage scheme must also satisfy EP. We now pro-
vide conditions for when the scheme given in Lemma 3 is implementable, and
hence optimal. For this scheme we have βLL = ηQL +
δ
1−δ [S − π + c] (since
EA binds for this bonus), and inserting this and the other bonuses in EP the
constraint takes the form
1
qˆH + qL
µ
c
∆q
− η∆Q
¶
≤ δ
1− δ [∆q∆Q− c]
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Define δ2 = δ2(η) as the minimal δ satisfying the inequality, i.e.
1− δ2
δ2
=
[∆q∆Q− c]
c− η∆q∆Q(qˆH + qL)∆q
From this we see that for δ ≥ δ2 the scheme given in the Lemma satisfies EP
and hence is implementable. Note that δ2 is decreasing in η. Hence, we have
the following result.14
Proposition 4 For η ≥ η1 and δ ≥ δ2(η) the JPE wage scheme given by
(15) is implementable and uniquely optimal. As the share of values (η) that
the agents can hold-up ex post increases, the scheme approaches an IPE
scheme.
For given η ≥ η1 and for discount factors smaller than the critical factor
δ2, the scheme (15) will no longer be implementable. For δ = δ2 the dynamic
enforceability constraint for the principal (EP) is binding for βHH (and only
for this bonus), while the agent’s constraint EA is binding for the other
bonuses. The least costly way for the principal to adapt to a lower δ (and
hence a stricter EP) will then be to reduce βHH , and by that reduce the dif-
ference βHH−βHL. Note also that a lower δ will also increase βLH ,βLL, βHL
when EA binds, see (15). Thus, a lower δ will force the principal to mod-
ify the scheme towards an IPE scheme. To sum up: The possibility for the
agents to hold-up values forces the principal to oﬀer a greater extent of in-
dividualized incentives at the expense of team incentives, even if the agents’
tasks are perfect complements.
3.2 Peer pressure
A more striking demonstration of the JPE hold-up problem can be made in
a setting with peer pressure. In order to highlight the eﬀects of this feature,
we return to the case of independent task technology, as modeled in Section
2. To model peer pressure in this framework, we assume that there are costs
associated with lowering the peer’s wage by realizing low output, i.e. that
agents experience disutility from being the ”weakest link”. Such an event
will occur with probability (1 − qH)qH if βHH > βHL. We represent this
disutility by d = max {ν(βHH − βHL), 0}, where ν is a cost parameter.
14Since the scheme is JPE, it does not yield uniqueness in the game played by the agents.
Indeed, we have here π(H,H,β)− c = π(L,H,β) = π(L,L,β), so eﬀorts HH and LL are
both equilibria, and they have equal payoﬀs. The agents thus have nothing to gain from
playing the low eﬀort equilibrium.
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This assumption is in some sense in the spirit of Kandel and Lazear
(1992). They distinguish between internal peer pressure, or guilt, when eﬀort
is unobservable among the agents, and external pressure, or shame, when
eﬀort is observable. In our model, eﬀort is unobservable, so our assumption
can be interpreted as guilt. However, output is observable, so the weakest link
eﬀect can also be interpreted as shame. A point here is that our assumption
is not directly related to the disutility from low eﬀort. It is output that
matters. Low eﬀort gives no disutility if it leads to high output (which it
does with probability qL.) And high eﬀort may induce disutility if it leads
to low output. The shame interpretation is therefore most appropriate.
Let D denote the expected disutility associated with being the weakest
link:
D = (1− qH)qHd = (1− qH)qH max {ν(βHH − βHL), 0}
In a high eﬀort equilibrium, each agent’s expected utility is now
π −D − c = qH [qHβHH + (1− qH)βHL]
+(1− qH) [qH(βLH −max {ν(βHH − βHL), 0}) + (1− qH)βLL]− c
This yields an IC constraint as follows
qHβHH+(1−qH)βHL−qH(βLH−max {ν(βHH − βHL), 0})−(1−qH)βLL ≥
c
∆q
(ICd)
From this constraint and the definition of π we have
π = qH [qHβHH + (1− qH)βHL] + (1− qH) [qHβLH + (1− qH)βLL]
≥ qH
∙
c
∆q
+ qH(βLH −max {ν(βHH − βHL), 0}) + (1− qH)βLL
¸
+(1− qH) [qHβLH + (1− qH)βLL]
Hence
π ≥ qH
c
∆q
− q2H max {ν(βHH − βHL), 0}+ qHβLH + (1− qH)βLL (16)
We now see that if ν > 0, it is uniquely optimal to set βHL = βLH =
βLL = 0, and (solving from ICd) βHH =
c
qH∆q(1+ν)
. Hence, we have:
Proposition 5 If output is verifiable, and there exists peer pressure (ν > 0),
there is a unique optimal wage scheme, namely the JPE scheme β =(βHH , 0, 0, 0)
where βHH =
c
qH∆q(1+ν)
. The associated minimal wage cost is πm = qH c∆q
1
ν+1 .
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We see that the wage cost is now lower than in the case where ν = 0, i.e.
qH
c
∆q
1
ν+1 < qH
c
∆q for ν > 0 (see appendix on low eﬀort equilibria). Hence,
by oﬀering incentives based on JPE, the principal can exploit the disutility
eﬀect of being the weakest link.
We will now demonstrate that when output is non-verifiable, the optimal
scheme is not only a less stark JPE scheme. In fact any JPE scheme is
sub-optimal once the relational contract constraints bind.
The dynamic enforceability constraint EA for the agents here takes the
form
min {βHH − ηQH ,βHL − ηQH , βLH − d− ηQL, βLL − ηQL} ≥
δ
1− δ [S − π +D + c]
Using (16), which follows from the present IC-constraint, and EA for
bonuses βLH and βLL, we get:
π ≥ qH
c
∆q
− q2Hd+
µ
ηQL +
δ
1− δ [S − π +D + c] + qHd
¶
= qH
c
∆q
+ ηQL +
δ
1− δ [S − (π −D) + c] +D
Collecting terms involving π −D and substituting for S we then obtain
π ≥ qH
c
∆q
+ ηQL − δ
∙
c
∆q
− η∆Q
¸
qL +D
We see that to minimize π, the principal will want to set D as small as
possible i.e. make d = max {ν(βHH − βHL), 0} as small as possible. This
means setting βHH−βHL = 0, provided this is feasible by EP. It follows that
the IPE wage scheme together with the feasible RPE schemes on ICd are
optimal once the enforceability condition EA binds.
We see that for η ≥ η0 we have ηQL− δ
h
c
∆q − η∆Q
i
qL > 0 for all δ ≤ 1,
and so EA will indeed bind at outcomes LL and LH. Provided βHH−βHL = 0
is feasible (EP is satisfied), then EA’ and IC’ will hold. EP will be satisfied
for this solution if EP’ holds for βHH = βHL, which is the case if 2(βHH −
βLH − η∆Q) ≤ 2δ1−δ [∆q∆Q− c]. From EA’ and IC’ we see that this holds if
δ ≥ δ¯ given by
1− δ¯
δ¯
=
[∆q∆Q− c]
c
∆q − η∆Q
For δ ≥ δ¯ an IPE wage scheme (βHH = βHL) is thus optimal.15 We have the
15It can be shown that for suﬃciently low discount factors the ”commitment advantage”
of RPE dominates the problem of peer-dependence. An RPE scheme βHL > βHH > 0 is
thus uniquely optimal for suﬃciently low discount factors. The commitment advantage of
RPE is analyzed in Kvaløy and Olsen (2006).
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following result:
Proposition 6 When there is peer pressure (ν > 0) and agent hold-up (η ≥
η0) we have: For δ ≥ δ¯ an IPE wage scheme (with βHH = βHL) satisfying
(8), ICd and EA’ is feasible and optimal. The minimal wage cost is πmin
given in Lemma 2. Any wage scheme with βHH − βHL > 0 yields a strictly
larger cost, thus any JPE scheme is strictly inferior to IPE (and feasible
RPE schemes).
The intuition for this result goes as follows: without EA binding, the
principal can exploit peer pressure by oﬀering a JPE scheme so that the
agents exert eﬀort in order to avoid the weakest link disutility eﬀect. Once
EA binds, the agents have an outside market as a threat point. In the outside
market IPE rules, and there are no disutility eﬀects. In order to implement
JPE, the principal then has to compensate the agents for this eﬀect. But
then JPE becomes more expensive than IPE or RPE, where no such eﬀects
exist. In other words: once the outside market becomes suﬃciently tempting
the principal can no longer use JPE to exploit the eﬀect of peer pressure, but
has to compensate the agents for any disutility eﬀects that team incentives
provide.
4 Concluding remarks
In an interesting review of the history of employment relationships, Peter
Cappelli (2000) argues that the last twenty years have seen a dramatic shift
from traditional bureaucratic employment structures to "inside contracting
systems (...) shaped by individualized incentives and pressures from outside
labor markets." In this paper we have analyzed the consequence of this trend
on firms’ ability to design peer-dependent incentives, such as relative and
group-based performance pay. We have shown that compensation tied to
peer-performance can induce employee-hold-up and obstruct the implemen-
tation of relational incentive contracts.
The model presented may explain the extensive use of individual perfor-
mance pay in human-capital-intensive industries. Tremblay and Chenevert
(2004) and Appelbaum (1991) note that even if knowledge-based industries
are characterized by teamwork, the challenge to retain the most critical re-
sources increases the pertinence of rewarding individual performance. Our
model supports this conjecture.
In addition, the model can contribute to explain why relative performance
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evaluation is used less in CEO compensation than agency theory suggests.16
Even though our model has a multilateral feature, i.e. one principal con-
tracting with two agents, what drives our result is the agents’ temptations
to renegotiate when not being paid according to absolute output. A CEO
interpretation is therefore not unreasonable since they are in the position
of holding up values ex post if not being paid a ”fair share” of their value
added.
There is a large literature discussing human capital and problems of
expropriation in modern corporations. Recent papers include Kessler and
Lülfesmann (2006) who show how the firm can balance incentive provision
between general and firm specific investments in human capital in order to
mitigate the hold-up problem; and Rajan and Zingales (2001) who argue
that human-capital-intensive industries will develop flat organizations with
distinctive technologies and cultures in order to avoid expropriation. We
complement this literature by showing how indispensable human capital af-
fects the firm’s feasible incentive design.
Our model also complements the seminal paper by Holmström and Mil-
grom (1994). They show how asset ownership gives a firm the ability to
restructure the incentives of those who join the firm (the employees). In
particular, they show how a firm - by giving up control rights - loses the
ability to balance incentives between various tasks. We show how the firm -
by giving up control rights - loses the ability to exploit the advantages that
lies in designing peer-dependent incentives.
Appendix
Appendix to Lemma 1
We here verify the statements made in the remark following the lemma.
For any contract βwe have (Che and Yoo, 2001)
π(H,H,β)+π(L,L,β)−π(H,L,β)−π(L,H,β) = (qH−qL)2 (βHH − βHL)
When IC binds (π(H,H,β)− c = π(L,H,β)) we thus have
π(L,L,β)− (π(H,L,β)− c) = (qH − qL)2 (βHH − βHL)
This is non-negative for RPE or IPE contracts, hence eﬀorts HH is then a
unique equilibrium for the given contract. The expression is however negative
for JPE, hence eﬀorts LL is then another equilibrium.
Next compare equilibrium payoﬀs. Note that for βLH = βLL we have
π(L,L,β) = qL [qLβHH + (1− qL)βHL] + (1− qL)βLL
16See Murphy (1999) who states that ’the paucity of RPE in options and other compo-
nents of executive compensation remains a puzzle worth understanding’. See also Aggarwal
and Samwick (1999).
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π(L,H,β) = qL [qHβHH + (1− qH)βHL] + (1− qL)βLL
so
π(L,L,β)− π(L,H,β) = −qL∆q(βHH − βHL)
Hence for a JPE contract with IC binding we have
π(L,L,β) < π(L,H,β) = π(H,H,β)− c
Thus the HH equilibrium yields a higher payoﬀ than the LL equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 1
It remains to prove statement (ii). By definition of δˆ no wage scheme can
satisfy IC and EP’ for δ < δˆ. The statement then follows when we show that
EP’ is a necessary condition for implementability. To prove this, first note
that EA implies
βLj − ηQL ≥ δ1−δ [S − π + c], j = H,L.
Condition EP implies
2(βHH−βLH−η∆Q)+2(βLH−ηQL) = 2(βHH−ηQH) ≤ 2δ1−δ [∆q∆Q− π + S]
and
(βHL − βLL − η∆Q) + (βLH − ηQL) + (βLL − ηQL)
= (βHL+βLH−ηQH−ηQL) ≤ 2δ1−δ [∆q∆Q− π + S]
Using these three inequalities we see that EP’ follows. This completes the
proof.
Verification of (10 - 11).
We verify here that (10 - 11) hold for the schemes stated in Proposition
1 when δ ≥ δˆ. We have
π − S =
³
qH
c
∆q + ηQL − δ(
c
∆q − η∆Q)qL
´
− η(QL +∆QqL)
= qL
c
∆q + c− δ(
c
∆q − η∆Q)qL − η∆QqL
= (1− δ)( c∆q − η∆Q)qL + c
This shows that π − S > c, hence (10) holds. We further have
π − S − c < (1− δˆ)( c∆q − η∆Q)qL
= δˆ [∆q∆Q−c]
c−η∆Q∆q∆q(2− qH)(
c
∆q − η∆Q)qL
= δˆ [∆q∆Q− c] (2− qH)qL < [∆q∆Q− c]
where the last inequality follows from δˆ < 1 and (2−qH)qL < (2−qH)qH < 1.
Hence we see that (11) holds.
Verification of (13 - 14).
Substituting from βHH from (ICt) in π(H,H,β) yields
π ≥ qˆ
2
H
qˆH + qL
µ
c
∆q
− [1− qˆH − qL] (βHL + βLH) + [2− qˆH − qL] βLL
¶
+qˆH(1− qˆH)(βHL + βLH) + (1− qˆH)2βLL
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Hence
π ≥ qˆ
2
H
qˆH + qL
c
∆q
+ qˆ2H
µ
1− qˆH
qˆH
− 1− qˆH − qL
qˆH + qL
¶
(βHL + βLH)
+qˆ2H
µ
(1− qˆH)2
qˆ2H
+
2− qˆH − qL
qˆH + qL
¶
βLL
=
qˆ2H
qˆ2H − q2L
c+
qˆHqL
qˆH + qL
(βHL + βLH) +
µ
1− 2qˆHqL
qˆH + qL
¶
βLL
This verifies (13).
Then, using EA for βHL,βLH ,βLL in (13) yields
π ≥ qˆ
2
H
qˆ2H − q2L
c+
p
2
η∆Q+ ηQL +
δ
1− δ [S − π + c]
Collecting terms involving π and substituting for S = η(QL + qL∆Q) we get
π ≥ (1− δ)
µ
qˆ2H
qˆ2H − q2L
c+
p
2
η∆Q+ ηQL
¶
+ δ [S + c]
=
qˆ2H
qˆ2H − q2L
c+
p
2
η∆Q+ ηQL − δ
∙
q2L
qˆ2H − q2L
c− η
³
qL −
p
2
´
∆Q
¸
We have qL − p2 = qL −
qˆHqL
qˆH+qL
=
q2L
qˆH+ql
. This verifies (14).
Proof of Lemma 3
Note first that η1∆q∆Q < c forQL > 0, hence (6) is satisfied. The deriva-
tion of (14) shows that for η ≥ η1 the minimal wage cost is given by πm(δ),
that this cost exceeds the minimal cost for verifiable output, and that the
minimum is attained when IC binds, and when EA binds for βHL, βLH , βLL.
To verify the expression for βLL note that (13) may be written as π ≥
qˆ2H
qˆ2H−q2L
c+p
2
((βHL−βLL)+(βLH−βLL))+βLL. When EA binds for βHL,βLH ,βLL
the RHS equals πm(δ), and we thus have πm(δ) =
qˆ2H
qˆ2H−q2L
c+ p
2
η∆Q+βLL. This
yields the stated expression for βLL. Next, substituting for βLH = βLL =
βHL−η∆Q in (ICt) and solving this for βHH when the constraint binds then
yields the stated expression for βHH . To see this, note that the substitution
yields
[qˆH + qL]βHH+[1− qˆH − qL] (2βHL−η∆Q)−[2− qˆH − qL] (βHL−η∆Q) =
c
∆q
Solving this for βHH yields the stated expression.
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